Hindsight Bias in Patent Law: Comparing the USPTO and the EPO by Quinlan, Zachary
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 37, Issue 6 2014 Article 3
Hindsight Bias in Patent Law: Comparing the
USPTO and the EPO
Zachary Quinlan∗
∗Fordham Law School
Copyright c©2014 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
 
1787
NOTE 
HINDSIGHT BIAS IN PATENT LAW: COMPARING 
THE USPTO AND THE EPO 
By: Zachary Quinlan* 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1788
I. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND OF HINDSIGHT BIAS AND 
PATENT LAW ...................................................................... 1793
A. Hindsight Bias .................................................................. 1793
1. The Problem of Hindsight ........................................... 1793
B. Obviousness Law in the United States ............................. 1797
1. Scope and Content of the Prior Art: Analogous Art ... 1798
2. Level of Ordinary Skill  Differences Between the 
Invention and the Art ................................................ 1800
3. Objective Indicia ......................................................... 1802
C. Inventive Step in the EPO ................................................. 1804
1. Closest Prior Art .......................................................... 1805
i. Same Purpose or Effect .......................................... 1805
ii. Most Promising Starting Point .............................. 1806
2. Objective Technical Problem ...................................... 1806
3. The Could/Would Approach ....................................... 1808
4 . Secondary Indicators in the EPO ............................... 1810
II. HINDSIGHT IS 20/10 ................................................................ 1811
A. Starting Point in the Prior Art, The Benchmark of 
Comparison ..................................................................... 1811
B. The Problem an Inventor is Trying to Fix ........................ 1813
C. Modifying and Combining Prior Art ................................ 1815
D. Objective Indicia ............................................................... 1816
III. IMPROVEMENTS VIA TRANS-ATLANTIC SHARING ...... 1817

* J.D., 2014, Fordham University School of Law; A.B., 2009, Lafayette College. The 
Author extends his thanks to Professors John Richards and Hugh Hansen for their help, 
feedback, and criticism of this Note, and the editors of Volume 37 and 38 of the Fordham 
International Law Journal for their valuable feedback. The Author also thanks friends and 
family who supported and encouraged him to finish this Note.  
1788 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1787 
A. The Inventor’s Problem .................................................... 1817
B. Combining Prior Art ......................................................... 1818
C. Objective Indicia ............................................................... 1819
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 1819
 
INTRODUCTION 
  Stem cells can be used to treat patients whose ability to 
generate new blood cells has been compromised by diseases such as 
lymphoma and leukemia.1 Before the work of the inventors of US 
patent 5,004,681, stem cells were implanted in patients via bone 
marrow transplants.2 Umbilical cord blood was considered a potential 
source of stem cells, but it was not clear whether human umbilical 
cord blood contained stem cells, or whether it would be suitable for 
transplant in adult human patients.3 The use of cord blood for stem 
cell transplants presents many advantages over bone marrow 
transplants including, for example, the ability to be frozen for later 
use and the relative ease of matching patients and donors.4 Based on 
the discovery that cord blood contained transplantable stem cells, the 
inventors obtained US patent number 5,004,681 (“681 patent”) on 
April 2, 1991 and obtained its European counterpart, number 
0,343,217, on May 15, 1996.5 Barring any problems, the US patent 

1. U.S. Patent No. 5,004,681 col. 4 I. 54–61 [hereinafter ‘681 Patent] (explaining the use 
of stem cells to restore patients’ ability to generate various blood cell types); Loyola Univ. 
Health Sys., Breakthrough in treating leukemia, lymphoma patients with umbilical cord blood 
stem cells, SCIENCE DAILY (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/
2013/12/131209104923.htm [hereinafter Breakthrough] (summarizing how stem cells from 
cord blood and bone marrow can be used to regenerate blood cells). 
2. ‘681 Patent, supra note 1, at col. 4 l. 43–col. 5 l. 22 (describing the use of bone 
marrow transplantation as a source of stem cells to treat diseases and repair patients’ ability to 
produce blood); Breakthrough, supra note 1 (describing cord blood transplants as an 
alternative to bone marrow transplants). 
3. PharmaStem Therapeutics v. Viacell, 491 F.3d 1342, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Newman, 
J., dissenting) (citing testimony from a defense witness that stem cells were unconfirmed in 
cord blood before the work of the inventors); id. at 1376 (citing evidence that experts did not 
expect cord blood to provide a source of stem cells useful for transplants). 
4. Comparison Between Bone Marrow or Peripheral Blood Stem Cells and Cord Blood 
Donated for Transplantation, NAT’L CORD BLOOD PROGRAM (2010), http://
www.nationalcordbloodprogram.org/qa/comparison.html (comparing the advantages and 
disadvantages of bone marrow transplants and cord blood transplants); ‘681 Patent, supra note 
1, at col. 5 l. 23–28, col. 22 l. 35–col. 24 l. 30 (describing the difficulty of finding matching 
bone marrow donors and how stem cells can be frozen and thawed). 
5.  ‘681 Patent, supra note 1, at [45] (stating the date of patent issue); EPO Patent No. 
0,343,217 B1, [45] (stating the date of patent grant). 
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would last for seventeen years after it was issued, and the European 
Patents would last twenty years.6  
 Years later, Pharmastem Therapeutics, Inc., owner of the ‘681 
patent, took advantage of its patent and filed an infringement lawsuit 
against competitors.7 The defendants challenged the ‘681 patent’s 
validity as not patentable for obviousness reasons in a 2003 jury trial, 
but the jury weighed the evidence and found the ‘681 patent valid and 
infringed by the defendants.8 The district court also denied 
defendants’ motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (“JMOL”), 
concluding that the jury’s finding of non-obviousness and validity 
were reasonable.9  On appeal, a Federal Circuit panel found that the 
‘681 patent was obvious and invalid in a 2-1 split decision.10 The 
majority opinion in Pharmastem has been criticized as a decision 
based on hindsight because it found the patent to be obvious despite 
evidence that other scientists in the same field heralded the invention 
as an important breakthrough.11 This case illustrates how it is easy to 
say that an inventor should have seen the “obvious” solution once the 
unknown future becomes the certain past, even if those ideas were not 
so obvious at the time.12 

6. 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1) (1994) (“The term of a patent that is in force on or that results 
from an application filed before the date that is 6 months after the date of the enactment of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act shall be the greater of the 20-year term as provided in 
subsection (a), or 17 years from grant”); Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 
63(1), 2013 (“The term of the European patent shall be 20 years from the date of filing of the 
application.”). The Uruguay Round Agreements Act was enacted on December 8, 1994, 
making the critical date June 8, 1995. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, H.R. 5110, 103d 
Cong. (1994).  
7. PharmaStem Therapeutics v. Viacell, No. 02-148-GMS, Jury Verdict Form at 1–4 (D. 
Del. Oct. 29, 2003) (reciting that PharmaStem filed the initial lawsuit). 
8. Id. at 1346 (finding that defendants infringed the ‘681 patent and that the ‘681 patent 
was valid and not obvious). 
9. Id. at 1359 (noting the district court’s denial of JMOL to defendants). 
10. Id. (holding that the district should have ruled in favor of the defendants on the issue 
of obviousness). 
11. Yu Cai, Using Hindsight in Determining Patent Obviousness: Observations on 
PharmaStem v. Viacell, 48 JURIMETRICS J. 379, 403 (criticizing the Federal Circuit for using 
hindsight to assert that an invention was the result of routine experimentation to confirm a 
known scientific prediction); PharmaStem, 491 F.3d at 1374 (Newman, J., dissenting) 
(accusing the majority opinion of “[using] present knowledge of the inventors’ success to find 
that it was obvious all along.”). 
12. Baruch Fischhoff, Perceived Informativeness of Facts, 3 HUMAN PERCEPTION AND 
PERFORMANCE 349, 349 (1977) (“In hindsight terms, we may believe that the facts we hear 
more or less had to be the answers to their respective questions.”); Neal J. Rose & Kathleen D. 
Vohs, Hindsight Bias, 7 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. 411, 411–12 (2012) 
1790 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1787 
 In both the United States and Europe inventions must be 
novel and have an inventive step in order to justify the monopoly 
granted to patentees, and the ‘681 patent failed to meet the inventive 
step requirement.13 An invention lacks novelty if all its features can 
be found together in a single prior invention or publication, known as 
“prior art.”14 To satisfy the inventive step requirement, an invention 
cannot be obvious.15 Obviousness is evaluated from the perspective of 
a person having ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”)16 at the time of 
filing a patent.17 Obviousness is shown by either combining the 
teachings of multiple related prior art references18 or by modifying a 
single reference.19 The issue that arises is whether a given 

(describing hindsight as “the inability to recapture the feeling of uncertainty that preceded an 
event.”). 
13. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2012) (requiring novelty and non-obviousness for 
inventions to be patentable); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 
147, 152–53 (1950) (reasoning that a patent monopoly is justified by a meaningful 
contribution to technical knowledge); Convention on the Grant of European Patents arts. 52, 
54, 56, Oct. 5 1973 (requiring novelty and inventive step for inventions to be patentable). 
14. See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, CASE LAW OF THE BOARDS OF APPEAL at 107 (7th 
ed. 2013), http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/case-law.html [hereinafter CASE 
LAW OF THE BOA] (stating that multiple prior art references may not be combined to show 
novelty); Specialty Rental Tools & Supply, Inc. v. Boyd's Bit Serv., Inc., 84 F. App'x 90, 96 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Prior art anticipates when it discloses and enables each and every element of 
the challenged claim.”). 
15. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (“A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if the 
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention 
as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to 
a person having ordinary skill in the art . . .”); Convention on the Grant of European Patents 
art. 56, Oct. 5 1973 (“An invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if . . . it 
is not obvious to a person skilled in the art.”). 
16. The Person Having Ordinary Skill In The Art (“PHOSITA”) is a fictitious person 
who practices in the technical field of a given invention, and is used as part of the test for 
obviousness in patent law. See Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to 
the Obviousness of Inventions, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 992–93 (2008) (discussing the 
role of the PHOSITA as a hypothetical person used to make evaluations in patent law); Joseph 
P. Meara, Just Who is the Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent Law’s Mysterious 
Personage, 77 WASH. L. REV. 267, 267 (2002) (comparing the PHOSITA’s role in patent law 
to that of the reasonable person in torts). 
17. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
18. “Prior art” is the documents that can be used against a patent application to show that 
it is not novel or is obvious; any particular piece of the prior art is called a reference, whether it 
is a patent, a technical publication, a public use of an invention. See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, 
CHISUM ON PATENTS Gl-18 (Matthew Bender, Release No. 144 2014); BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 126-27, 1393 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “prior art” and “reference” as terms of art 
in patent law referring to the knowledge available to reject a patent application). 
19. See UNITED STATES GROUP, QUESTION Q217: THE PATENTABILITY CRITERION OF 
INVENTIVE STEP / NON-OBVIOUSNESS, 6 (AIPPI 2011) [hereinafter AIPPI US GROUP 
REPORT], available at https://www.aippi.org/download/commitees/217/GR217usa.pdf 
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combination or modification of prior art would have been obvious to 
a PHOSITA.20 
Under both US and European patent law, the judgment of 
obviousness should be made from the perspective of a PHOSITA 
before the filing date, without knowledge of how the invention 
works.21 In reality a patent may be reviewed by examiners, judges, 
and juries who determine obviousness with detailed knowledge of the 
exact nature of the invention.22 They must therefore look back in time 
to make two essential judgments: the level of the PHOSITA’s skill 
and knowledge at the filing date and whether a particular combination 
or modification would have been obvious to that PHOSITA.23 
Evaluators who know what happened after an event cannot forget or 
ignore this knowledge when making a judgment: this is hindsight 
bias, which makes it impossible to judge whether an invention would 

(explaining that obviousness can be shown in the United States based on one reference or a 
combination of references). For EPO practice see THE NETHERLANDS GROUP, QUESTION 
Q217: THE PATENTABILITY CRITERION OF INVENTIVE STEP / NON-OBVIOUSNESS , 3–4 (AIPPI 
2011) [hereinafter AIPPI NETHERLANDS GROUP REPORT], available at https://www.aippi.org/
download/commitees/217/GR217the_netherlands.pdf (discussing inventive step in the EPO in 
terms of either modification of a single reference, or combinations of two or more references). 
20. See AIPPI US GROUP REPORT, supra note 19, at 5 (explaining that a PHOSITA’s 
motivation is relevant to determining whether a combination of prior art would be obvious); 
AIPPI NETHERLANDS GROUP REPORT, supra note 19, at 2–4 (reciting EPO requirements that 
inventions not be obvious to a PHOSITA and discussing the need to show a motivation for a 
PHOSITA to combine prior art). 
21. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (defining obviousness from the perspective of a PHOSITA 
before the filing date); Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 54(2), Oct. 5 1973 
(“The state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made available to the public . . .  
before the date of filing of the European patent application.”). 
22. See Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the 
hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1399–1400  (2006) 
[hereinafter Patently Non-Obvious I] (stating that evaluators of obviousness cannot forget their 
knowledge of the invention); Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious II: Experimental 
Study on the Hindsight Issue Before the Supreme Court in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 YALE J.L. & 
TECH 1, 3 (2007) [hereinafter Patently Non-Obvious II] (claiming that judges, juries, and 
examiners have detailed knowledge of an invention when they examine it). 
23. See Alan P. Klein, Understanding the Doctrines of “Reason, Suggestion, or 
Motivation to Combine” and “Reason, Suggestion, or Motivation to Modify”, 45 IDEA 293, 
293 (2005) (framing a discussion of obviousness in two parts, one for combination inventions, 
and one for modification inventions); GERMANY GROUP, QUESTION Q217: THE 
PATENTABILITY CRITERION OF INVENTIVE STEP / NON-OBVIOUSNESS, 5–6 (AIPPI 2011) 
[hereinafter AIPPI GERMANY GROUP REPORT], available at https://www.aippi.org/
download/commitees/217/GR217germany_en.pdf (discussing how prior art can be modified or 
combined to show obviousness in German and EPO patent practice). 
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have been obvious to somebody who has not been told how it 
works.24  
 This Note will compare how each patent system addresses, or 
fails to address, hindsight bias, and recommends how each system 
could improve by adopting features from the other. Both the 
European and US patent systems are aware of the problem of 
hindsight in patent examinations, and a patent validity decision based 
on hindsight is technically improper in both systems.25 The 
examination guidelines of the European Patent Office (“EPO”) 
directly address the issue of “ex post facto” analysis and conclude that 
it is an improper basis for a decision.26 The United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) and US courts have also made it clear 
that “[i]t is difficult but necessary that the decision maker forget what 
he or she has been taught at trial about the claimed invention and cast 
the mind back to the time the invention was made (often as here many 
years), to occupy the mind of one skilled in the art who is presented 
only with the references, and who is normally guided by the then-
accepted wisdom in the art.”27 

24. See Patently Non-Obvious I, supra note 22, at 1399–1400 (stating that evaluators of 
obviousness cannot forget their knowledge of the outcome of an event and are subject to 
hindsight); Rose & Vohs, supra note 12, at 411–12 (describing hindsight as “the inability to 
recapture the feeling of uncertainty that preceded an event.”). 
         25. Compare EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION, pt. G, ch. 
VII, at 8-9 (June 2012), available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/
guidelines.html [hereinafter EPO GUIDELINES], (advising examiners to take a realistic view of 
the entirety of the prior art because the prior art search is done with the knowledge of what the 
invention achieves and how it is achieved), and CASE LAW OF THE BOA, supra note 14, at 184 
(discussing case law in the EPO that rejects combinations of prior art based on ex post facto 
analysis as a way to show obviousness), and Case T 0294/99 of the Technical Boards of 
Appeal of the EPO, at 11 (April 18, 2002) (ruling that the teaching of two prior art documents 
would only be combined by a PHOSITA with the benefit of hindsight from the invention), 
with Kenetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith  Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(stating that constructing inventions from prior art using hindsight is not an acceptable way to 
show obviousness), and W.L. Gore  Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (“To imbue one of ordinary skill in the art with knowledge of the invention in 
suit . . . is to fall victim to the insidious effect of a hindsight syndrome wherein that which only 
the inventor taught is used against its teacher.”), and UNITED STATES PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2141.01, III (2012), 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/ [hereinafter MPEP] (teaching that 
the requirement to evaluate an invention “at the time the invention was made” is meant to 
avoid hindsight). 
26. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
27. Garlock, 721 F.2d at 1553; see also CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 
1310 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“While apparently routine at the present time to use computers to 
perform instantaneous international financial transactions, this court will not engage in the 
hindsight error of speculating about the state of that technology over twenty years ago.”). 
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In this Note, Part I begins with a general look into hindsight bias 
and its causes and effects. Part I also evaluates obviousness and 
inventive step in US courts, the USPTO, and the EPO. This analysis 
includes a comparison of the legal tests employed in each jurisdiction. 
Part II of this Note compares how hindsight bias affects the proper 
functioning of both patent systems. Finally, Part III recommends that 
both systems take something from the other to help avoid hindsight, 
and that both systems give objective indicia of non-obviousness 
greater weight in their decisions.  
  I. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND OF HINDSIGHT BIAS AND 
PATENT LAW 
 This Part begins with an overview of the causes and effects of 
hindsight bias. Then, this Part provides an overview of the various 
tests used in the United States and the EPO to evaluate inventive step. 
A. Hindsight Bias 
1. The Problem of Hindsight 
 Before discussing the US and European patent systems in 
greater detail, it is helpful to discuss the causes and effects of 
hindsight bias to better understand how it affects the law, including 
patent law. Hindsight bias is a mental bias present in the evaluation of 
past decisions or events where the evaluator knows the outcome of 
those decisions or events, particularly when judging the likelihood, 
foreseeability, or predictability of a past event from an ex ante 
perspective.28 Hindsight bias also causes harsher judgments of others, 
as people are more likely to believe that the subject of the judgment 
should have foreseen the actual outcome and prepared for it.29  

28. See Rose & Vohs, supra note 12, at 411–13 (describing three levels of hindsight bias, 
distorted memories of a past decision, a sense that the actual outcome was inevitable, and a 
subject’s belief that he foresaw the outcome, summarized as “the inability to recapture the 
feeling of uncertainty that preceded an event.”); D. Jordan Lowe & Philip M.J. Reckers, The 
Effects of Hindsight Bias on Jurors’ Evaluations of Auditor Decisions, 25 DECISION SCIENCES 
401, 401 (1994) (stating that hindsight bias effects the perceived ability of people to predict 
past events); Hal R. Arkes et. al., Eliminating the Hindsight Bias, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 
305 (1988) (“Hindsight bias is defined as the tendency for people considering a past event to 
overestimate their likelihood of having predicted its occurrence.”). 
29. Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and the Hindsight 
Bias, 20 LAW.  HUM. BEHAV. 501, 510 (1996) (finding that potential jurors who knew whether 
therapists’ patients committed violent acts were more likely to find the therapists negligent 
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 Hindsight bias is present in many areas of law where judges 
and juries must look back in time and judge decisions made in the 
past, including negligence, malpractice, and corporate law.30 The 
California Supreme Court’s Tarasoff decision, which placed a duty on 
therapists to take measures to prevent harm if they believe a patient 
will harm a third party, is an example of hindsight bias.31 Tarasoff has 
been criticized as placing the extremely difficult decision whether to 
report in the hands of therapists, and then judging them with the 
benefit of hindsight if anything unfortunate happens.32 According to 
some, corporate decision-makers are better off in Delaware than 
California’s therapists, because the “business judgment rule” shields 
corporate decisions from hindsight second-guessing.33 Hindsight is a 
problem in these fields because the evaluator is supposed to adopt the 
perspective of somebody before the accident or decision in question.34 
 In patent law, hindsight bias is an important issue when 
determining if an invention has inventive step because it is a 
particularly subjective judgment that can be influenced by the 

than those who did not know patients later actions); Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex 
Post  Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW. HUM. BEHAV. 89, 98 (describing 
significant hindsight bias present in a study where potential jurors were asked to decide 
whether a city government should have taken additional flood precautions). 
30. See Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schpani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business 
Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587, 589–90 (1994) (comparing 
the prevalence of hindsight bias in medical malpractice decisions with the business judgment 
rule, which protects business executives from hindsight bias); LaBine & LaBine, supra note 
29, at 506–10 (discussing how the presence of an injured party makes potential jurors more 
likely to find negligence in a professional negligence case). 
31. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (1976) (“When a 
therapist determines . . . that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he 
incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim.”); LaBine & LaBine, 
supra note 29, at 501 (explaining the duty created under Tarasoff). 
32. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 361 (1976) (Clark, J., dissenting) (noting that psychiatrists, 
without the benefit of hindsight, face a much more difficult judgment than courts reviewing 
their decisions); LaBine & LaBine, supra note 29, at 512 (concluding that knowledge of a 
violent outcome may cause jurors in Tarasoff-type cases to judge therapists more harshly than 
is warranted). 
33. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 261 (Del. 2000) (holding that an expert’s 
opinion on what directors should have done did not overcome the business judgment rule 
because it was based on hindsight); Arkes & Schipani, supra note 30, at 610 (characterizing 
the business judgment rule as a way to protect corporate decisions from hindsight bias in 
courts). 
34. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345 (explaining that proof in hindsight that the wrong 
choice was made cannot establish liability in negligence); Arkes & Schipani, supra note 30, at 
588–89 (stating that courts presume that jurors can make decisions while ignoring their 
knowledge of an accident); LaBine & LaBine, supra note 29, at 502 (expressing concern that 
jurors in malpractice cases are biased by knowledge of the outcome). 
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evaluator’s perceptions of the past, and because it is very often the 
crux of patent examination and litigation.35 Hindsight bias arises in 
inventive step analysis because patent examiners, judges, and juries 
evaluate patent applications with the knowledge of the invention in 
question and how it works in comparison to prior known methods or 
devices.36 This knowledge makes these evaluators more likely to 
think an invention is obvious and refuse issuing a patent.37 
Courts have employed numerous methods to combat hindsight 
bias, although few of these methods have proven effective.38  Jury 
instructions telling jurors to ignore hindsight bias appear to have little 
or no effect on jury determinations of obviousness.39  For example, 

35. See Stephen G. Kunin & Philippe J.C. Signore, A Comparative Analysis of The 
Inventive Step Standard in the European and Japanese Patent Offices from a US Perspective, 
IP LITIGATOR, Jan./Feb. 2008, at 16 (describing obviousness as a subjective determination); 
Natalie A. Thomas, Note, Secondary Considerations in Non-Obviousness Analysis: The Use of 
Objective Indicia Following KSR v. Teleflex, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV., 2070, 2095 (2011) (describing 
obviousness as a subjective decision); Dennis Crouch, BPAI/PTAB Obviousness Decision 
Trends, http://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/12/bpaiptab-obviousness-decision-trends.html 
(determining that 80–85% of Patent Trial and Appeal Board decisions discuss obviousness); 
Patently Non-Obvious I, supra note 22 at 1398 (claiming that obviousness is the most litigated 
and most important requirement of patent validity). 
36. See EPO GUIDELINES, Part G - Ch. VII, at 8 (noting that prior art searches are done 
by examiners who know how the invention works); Patently Non-Obvious II, supra note 22 at 
3 (explaining that judges, jurors, and examiners know how an invention works when they 
evaluate its obviousness). 
37. See Patently Non-Obvious II, supra note 22, at 18 (concluding that subjects with 
knowledge of an invention are more likely to find it obvious); Patently Non-Obvious I, supra 
note 22, at 1409 (determining that potential jurors with knowledge of an invention are more 
likely to find it obvious).  
38. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966) (noting that secondary 
considerations can help courts to avoid hindsight in patent decisions); In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 
977, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The ‘motivation-suggestion-teaching’ requirement protects against 
the entry of hindsight into the obviousness analysis.”); Zonolite Co. v. United States, 149 F. 
Supp. 953, 957 (Ct. Cl. 1957) (“Hindsight cannot support an assertion of obviousness.”). 
39. See Patently Non-Obvious II, supra note 22, at 17 (discussing a study in which jury 
instructions based on the TSM test did not alleviate hindsight bias compared to instructions 
based on Graham); see also Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 29, at 99 (showing that jury 
instructions designed to alleviate hindsight bias did not effectively alleviate the bias in a 
negligence decision); Patently Non-Obvious I, supra note 22, at 1410 (finding that test subjects 
receiving debiasing jury instructions for patent validity were only slightly less likely to find 
obviousness than those who did not receive debiasing instructions). See also Fed. Circuit Bar 
Ass’n, Model Patent Jury Instructions, 51 (Feb. 2013), http://www.fedcirbar.org/olc
/filelib/LVFC/cpages/9008/Library/FCBA%20Model%20Patent%20Jury%20Instructions%20(
UPDATED%20Feb2013).pdf (instructing jurors not to use hindsight and consider obviousness 
from the time of invention); Nat’l Jury Instructions Project, Model Patent Jury Instructions, 48 
(June 17, 2009), http://www.nationaljuryinstructions.org/documents/NationalPatentJury
Instructions.pdf (warning jurors not to use hindsight). 
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the National Jury Instructions Project’s model patent jury instructions 
include this warning for jurors:  
[B]e careful not to determine obviousness using hindsight; many 
true inventions can seem obvious after the fact. You should put 
yourself in the position of a person of ordinary skill in the field of 
the invention at the time the claimed invention was made, and 
you should not consider what is known today or what is learned 
from the teaching of the patent.40 The Federal Circuit Bar 
Association’s obviousness instructions simply instruct jurors, 
“Do not use hindsight.”41 
Reducing the effects of hindsight bias is not a hopeless 
endeavor.42 Procedures that force evaluators to consider the foresight 
position and generate alternative possible outcomes are more effective 
in alleviating hindsight than simple education.43 Some other factors 
known to mitigate the effects of hindsight bias are better implemented 
by patent offices than courts.44 Expertise and experience in a 
particular area reduce the effect of hindsight bias, allowing patent 
examiners with an expertise in a technical field and familiarity with 
the obviousness determination to provide a more objective judgment 
of an invention.45 The advantage of expertise has led some to suggest 

40. Nat’l Jury Instructions Project, supra note 39, at 48. 
41. Fed. Circuit Bar Ass’n, supra note 39, at 51. 
42. See Martin F. Davies, Reduction of Hindsight Bias by Restoration of Foresight 
Perspective: Effectiveness of Foresight-Encoding and Hindsight-Retrieval Strategies, 40 ORG. 
BEHAV.  HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 50, 63 (1987) (reviewing experimental results showing a 
reduction in hindsight bias); Rose & Vohs, supra note 12 at 418–19 (explaining that expertise 
likely helps alleviate hindsight when an expert can receive regular feedback on their 
decisions). 
43. See Davies, supra note 42, at 56–57 (showing that test subjects with outcome 
knowledge of an event exhibited less hindsight bias if forced to review their own foresight 
notes about the event); id. at 63 (showing that test subjects with outcome knowledge of an 
event exhibited less hindsight bias if asked to generate various possible outcomes and develop 
reasons why each might have happened). 
44. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the 
Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 899–900 (2004) (suggesting changes 
to USPTO practice to alleviate hindsight bias); Patently Non-Obvious II, supra note 22, at 35–
36 (suggesting a bifurcated examination procedure to reduce hindsight in the USPTO). 
45. See Patently Non-Obvious II, supra note 22, at 23–24 (noting that expertise and 
familiarity with an area can slightly reduce the effects of hindsight bias); Rose & Vohs, supra 
note 12, at 418–19 (determining that expertise likely helps alleviate hindsight when an expert 
can receive regular feedback on their decisions). 
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that patent offices are better situated than courts to address the 
problem of hindsight bias in patent law.46   
B. Obviousness Law in the United States 
 US law requires that, in order to be inventive, inventions be 
non-obvious to a PHOSITA.47 The US patent statute alone, found in 
Title 35 of the US Code, does not give much guidance to the 
obviousness inquiry.48 In 1966 the US Supreme Court laid out three 
steps of inquiry to structure the obviousness determination in Graham 
v. John Deere Co.,: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the 
level of ordinary skill in the art; and (3) the differences between the 
claimed invention and the prior art.49 The last two steps are often 
combined into a single analysis, so this Note will treat them 
together.50 In addition to these three core inquiries, objective indicia 
must also be considered in a determination of obviousness.51 

46. See Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 899–900 (suggesting that the USPTO should consult 
current practitioners to get a more accurate view of what a PHOSITA would think of an 
invention); Patently Non-Obvious II, supra note 22, at 35–36 (suggesting that, to avoid 
hindsight, determination of obviousness at the USPTO be done by an additional examiner who 
is not given the details of the invention). 
47. 35 U.S.C § 103 (“A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained... if the 
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention 
as a whole would have been obvious . . .”); See AIPPI US GROUP REPORT, supra note 19, at 
1–2 (expressing the inventive step requirement in the United States in terms of obviousness). 
48. 35 U.S.C § 103 (stating only that an invention must not be obvious to a person 
skilled in the art pertaining to the invention); Dennis Crouch, KSR v. Teleflex: A Tale Full of 
Sound and Fury Signifying Little?, PATENTLYO (May 2, 2007), http://patentlyo.com/
patent/2007/05/ksr_v_teleflex_.html (“After seven Supreme Court cases on obviousness, there 
still is little guidance beyond the statutory language itself) concerning how a decision-maker is 
supposed to measure the level of ingenuity necessary to satisfy the non-obvious 
requirement.”). 
49. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) (defining the four stages of 
an obviousness analysis); Soverain Software LLC v. Newegg Inc., 705 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013) (using the Graham factors to evaluate obviousness); see also MPEP, supra note 25, 
§ 2141, II (directing patent examiners that a finding of obviousness must be based on the 
Graham inquiries). 
50. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401 (discussing combinability of 
references in terms of the PHOSITA’s capabilities); Norgen Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 699 
F.3d 1317, 1326 (determining the differences between the prior art and the invention in terms 
of what a PHOSITA would do). 
51. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18 (“Such secondary considerations as commercial success, 
long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the 
circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of 
obviousness or non-obviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy.”); In re Cyclobenzaprine 
Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1081–84 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (ruling that a long-felt need and the failure of others to meet that need were sufficient to 
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1. Scope and Content of the Prior Art: Analogous Art 
Under the first Graham factor, the Federal Circuit requires 
conducting the analogous art test to determine the scope and content 
of the prior art.52 While any prior art can be brought against a patent 
or patent application to show a lack of novelty, only “analogous art” 
may be considered to prove obviousness. 53 Art that is found not to be 
analogous cannot be used in a combination or modification to show 
obviousness.54 Prior art is analogous if it satisfies one of two criteria: 
(1) it is in the same field of endeavor as the invention; or (2) it was 
reasonably pertinent to a problem faced by the inventor.55 A prior art 
reference can be modified or combined with other prior art references 
to show obviousness if it is determined to be “analogous art.”56  
The first prong of the analogous art test, the field of endeavor, 
can be defined very broadly or very narrowly, depending on the level 

show that the invention was not obvious). Called “secondary considerations” in Graham, the 
last piece of obviousness analysis is known by many names, including “objective criteria.” See 
Amanda Wieker, Secondary Considerations Should Be Given Increased Weight in Obvious 
Inquiries Under 35 U.S.C. §103 in the Post-KSR v. Teleflex World, 17 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 665, 
666 (2008); see also id. at 674 (using “objective indicia”); Riverwood Int'l Corp. v. Mead 
Corp., 212 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (using “objective factors”); Applied Materials, 
Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(using “objective evidence”); Durie & Lemley, supra note 16, at 995 (using “secondary 
indicia”). This Note will use the term “objective indicia” in reference to US law. The EPO uses 
the term “secondary indicators,” which this Note will follow when discussing EPO law. See 
EPO GUIDELINES, pt. G ch VII § 10. 
52. See In Re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986–87 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining the analogous art 
test and its relationship to the Graham factors); In Re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 441–42 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986) (applying the analogous art test in the prior art section of an obviousness decision). 
53. See Lance Leonard Barry, Cézanne and Renior: Analogous Art in Patent Law, 13 
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 243, 245 (2005) (stating that the question of analogous art is relevant 
to obviousness, but not novelty); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding 
that, despite coming from different industries, prior art for hinges, housings, and latches were 
analogous to a patent for a laptop computer hinge because they addressed similar technical 
problems). 
54. Wang Labs, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 865 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“The Allen–
Bradley patent and X9 SIMM, not being analogous prior art, thus could not have rendered the 
claimed subject matter obvious.”); Baxter Diagnostics, Inc. v. AVL Scientific Corp., 924 F. 
Supp. 994, 1008 modified, 954 F. Supp. 199 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (“Because the Volmar and 
Widder article is not analogous prior art, the Court will not consider it in the obviousness 
analysis.”). 
55. See Barry, supra note 53, at 250 (stating two criteria for finding analogous art: the 
field of endeavor and pertinence to a problem with which the inventor was faced); Innovention 
Toys, LLC v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining 
field of endeavor and the problem addressed as the two criteria for finding analogous art). 
56. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
2014] HINDSIGHT BIAS IN PATENT LAW 1799 
of technical specialization present in the industry.57 Generally, 
advanced fields requiring a high degree of specialization, like 
computer memory design, will be defined more narrowly and less 
specialized fields will be defined more broadly.58 Courts, and the 
USPTO, exercise a degree of freedom when defining the inventor’s 
field, which may not always be defined as expected.59 Examiners and 
courts can also use prior art outside the field of endeavor where a 
similar problem or purpose is addressed by the reference.60  Prior art 
references with similar purposes are relevant to solving the same 
problems and are more likely to lead an inventor to consider them as 
solutions.61 How broadly a problem is defined can have a significant 
impact on obviousness decisions by determining which references 
may be used to invalidate a patent.62   

57. See Barry, supra note 53, at 247–50 (citing cases demonstrating that a broad range of 
art is considered analogous in the mechanical arts, while a more limited scope can be taken in 
computer memory design art); Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1481 (“We agree with the Board that given 
the nature of the problems confronted by the inventors, one of ordinary skill in the art would 
have consulted the mechanical arts for housings, hinges, latches, springs, etc. Thus, the cited 
references are reasonably pertinent...”) (internal quotations omitted). 
58. See Barry, supra note 53, at 246–49 (comparing the determination of analogous art in 
patent cases in simple mechanical fields to others in highly specialized fields, like computer 
memory design); Jeffery T. Burgess, The Analogous Art Test, 7 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 63, 
73 (2009) (claiming that the field of endeavor can be defined broadly for simple mechanical 
inventions like hairbrushes and toothbrushes, and more narrowly for complex, specialized 
inventions). 
59. See Barry, supra note 53, at 250–52 (summarizing a trend for the field of endeavor to 
be defined in terms of the functional character of the invention); Burgess, supra note 58, at 72 
(noting that the USPTO relies mainly on similar function to determine whether prior art is in 
the same field of endeavor as a patent application). 
60. See Barry, supra note 53, at 253 (“Similarities or differences between the field of a 
reference and that of an inventor are not important for the second criterion; it is the problems 
addressed by the reference and the inventor that matter.”); Paulsen, 30 F.3d at 1481 (ruling 
that prior art concerning “hinges and latches as used in a desktop telephone directory, a piano 
lid, a kitchen cabinet, a washing machine cabinet, a wooden furniture cabinet, or a two-part 
housing for storing audio cassettes” was analogous to a patent for a hinged portable computer 
because they were pertinent to the problems faced by the inventor). 
61. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (determining that using known elements to reach success 
as expected is usually obvious innovation, not patentable inventiveness); In Re Kubin, 561 
F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (discussing the importance of a “reasonable expectation of 
success” to determining obviousness). 
62. See Barry, supra note 53, at 253–58 (reviewing case law where addressing only one 
part of a compound problem is needed to make a prior art analogous); Burgess, supra note 58, 
at 68–69 (arguing that the breadth of analogous art is important because it determines the 
breadth of the PHOSITA’s knowledge in obviousness decisions). 
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2. Level of Ordinary Skill  Differences Between the Invention and the 
Art 
 The extent of the PHOSITA’s creativity and skill comes into 
play when deciding whether a PHOSITA would have performed a 
given combination or modification of prior art, rendering the 
invention obvious, or whether the combination or modification would 
have been beyond the PHOSITA’s creativity, and therefore not 
obvious.63 The PHOSITA is understood as having skills greater than 
an uncreative follower of prior art, but less than an insightful 
inventor.64 The PHOSITA’s knowledge includes what is disclosed in 
analogous prior art documents.65  
The Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in KSR v. Teleflex   
significantly impacted how a PHOSITA should read and use prior 
art.66 For many years before KSR the Federal Circuit67 consistently 
used the “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test (the “TSM test”) to 
decide obviousness, which required a teaching, suggestion, or 
motivation in the prior art that would give the PHOSITA a reason to 
perform a combination or modification to reach the invention and 
render it obvious and not patentable.68 The TSM test was intended to 

63. See AIPPI US GROUP REPORT, supra note 19, at 4–5 (discussing the PHOSITA’s 
key role in determining which modifications or combinations of prior art are obvious); KSR, 
550 U.S. at 419–21 (overturning a determination of non-obviousness based on the creativity of 
the PHOSITA); Joseph Scott Miller, Remixing Obviousness, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 237, 
247–50 (2008) (discussing the importance of the role of a PHOSITA’s creativity in 
determining obviousness). 
64. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (“a person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary 
creativity, not an automaton.”); see Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk 
Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (declining to adopt a limited 
application of prior art that would render the PHOSITA an “automaton”). 
65. See MPEP, supra note 25, § 2141.03 (stating that a PHOTITA “is presumed to have 
known the relevant art at the time of the invention.”); Burgess, supra note 58, at 68–69 (noting 
that analogous art is important because it defines the PHOSITA’s scope of knowledge of the 
prior art). 
66. Gene Quinn, KSR the 5th Anniversary: One Supremely Obvious Mess, IPWATCHDOG 
(Apr. 29, 2012, 12:36 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/04/29/ksr-the-5th-anniversary-
one-supremely-obvious-mess/ (explaining the KSR decision as changing what evidence can 
show that an invention would have been obvious to a PHOSITA); Dennis Crouch, Impact of 
KSR v. Teleflex on Pharmaceutical Industry, PATENTLYO, (May 3, 2007) http://patentlyo.com/
patent/2007/05/impact_of_ksr_v.html (reading KSR as requiring common sense be added to 
the determination of what is obvious to the PHOSITA). 
67 All patent appeals in the United States go to the Federal Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 
(2012) (granting the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction in all patent appeals from US 
district courts). 
68. See Commonwealth Sci. Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. (USA), Inc., 542 
F.3d 1363, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (discussing the tests for obviousness before and after 
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curtail hindsight bias, based on the reasoning that “combining prior 
art references without evidence of such a suggestion, teaching or 
motivation simply takes the inventor's disclosure as a blueprint for 
piecing together the prior art to defeat patentability—the essence of 
hindsight.”69 
 In 2007, the US Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s 
rigid use of the TSM test as a necessary condition to show 
obviousness.70 The court did not reject use of the TSM test outright, 
but instead admonished the Federal Circuit to accept other means of 
showing obviousness in addition to the TSM test.71 The KSR court 
emphasized that the PHOSITA’s level of creativity and skill is not as 
great as an inventor’s, but is greater than an “automaton,” who 
unthinkingly follows what the prior art indicates is possible.72 The 
PHOSITA is now capable of going beyond the TSM test and using 
earlier inventions for obvious purposes that were not explicitly 
disclosed where there is an expectation of success.73 A patentee can 

KSR);  D. Benjamin Borson, KSR v. Teleflex, Inc.: The Supreme Court Reviews Obviousness, 
89 J. PAT.  TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 523, 524–25 (2007) (summarizing Federal Circuit law 
leading up to KSR as requiring a showing of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine 
prior art to show obviousness); Marian Underweiser, Presumed Obvious: How KSR Redefines 
the obviousness inquiry to improve the public record of a patent, 50 IDEA 247, 255–56 (2010) 
(describing the TSM test as the test for obviousness in the Federal Circuit prior to the KSR 
decision). 
69. Borson, supra note 68, at 525. (quoting In Re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999)); see also In Re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (assuming that the patent 
office used hindsight bias to reach a finding of obviousness when the office did not use the 
teaching-suggestion-motivation test); Meara, supra note 16, at 275 (claiming that the Federal 
Circuit’s requirement for a suggestion or teaching in the prior art was intended to protect 
against hindsight in obviousness decisions); Obviousness, 121 HARV. L. REV. 375, 375–76 
(2007) (describing the TSM test as intended to combat hindsight).  
70. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 401–03 (ruling that rigid application of the TSM test as applied 
by the Federal Circuit was “incompatible with [the] Court's precedents.”); Underweiser, supra 
note 68, at 269 (summarizing KSR as requiring motivations for a PHOSITA beyond the TSM 
test). 
71. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 402 (“The flaws in the Federal Circuit's analysis relate mostly 
to its narrow conception of the obviousness inquiry consequent in its application of the TSM 
test.”); see also MPEP, supra note 25, § 2143 (emphasis added) (listing possible ways to make 
a prima facie case of obviousness, including “teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior 
art that would have led one of ordinary skill to modify the prior art reference or to combine 
prior art reference teachings to arrive at the claimed invention.”).  
72. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.  
73. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 420 (claiming that a PHOSITA can see uses for inventions 
beyond their express intended purposes); see also Miller supra note 63, at 239 (describing the 
PHOSITA’s newfound creativity as creating a presumption that analogous art can be 
combined); In Re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (discussing the importance of a 
“reasonable expectation of success” to determining obviousness). 
1802 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1787 
bring evidence that there was no expectation of success for the 
invention before it was made to show that success was not expected, 
although this can be difficult to prove.74 
 The USPTO noticed the Supreme Court’s instruction to go 
beyond just the TSM test when deciding obviousness, and now the 
MPEP lists seven exemplary, but not exclusive, rationales for 
showing obviousness. 75 These rationales have led to what some call a 
rebuttable presumption of combinability for analogous art because 
examiners have many ways to show that combinations would have 
been obvious.76 This implicit presumption of combinability, enabled 
by the USPTO’s new exemplary rationales, makes the determination 
of analogous art the key step in the obviousness inquiry because once 
art is determined to be analogous it can be used to show obviousness 
with minimal further justification.77 
3. Objective Indicia  
 Outside of the factors used to analyze prior art—the scope of 
the prior art, the level of skill in the art, and the differences between 
the invention and the art, US courts and the USPTO can look to 

74. Compare Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1360–
62 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (upholding a district court’s finding that there was no reasonable 
expectation of success, and that the patent in suit was valid), and Boston Scientific Corp. v. 
Johnson & Johnson, 550 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (citing an expert’s 
testimony that there was no expectation of success as evidence supporting a patent’s validity), 
and Ex Parte Slungaard, No. 2010-011511, 2011 WL 2535211 (P.T.A.B. June 23, 2011) 
(overturning an examiner’s rejection of claims because a hopeful prior art reference suggesting 
that a particular compound might be toxic did not create a reasonable expectation of success), 
with Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d 602, n.36 (D. Del. 
2013) (rejecting the patentee’s assertion that there was no expectation of success due to 
toxicity, because toxicity of the substance was not well known at the time of invention), and 
Ex Parte Krishnan, No. 2011-008777, 2011 WL 6739396 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 20, 2011) (rejecting 
patent applicants’ assertion that there was not a reasonable expectation of success, because 
there was no indication in the prior art that the claimed process was unpredictable). 
75. Compare UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2143 (8th ed. Rev. Aug. 5, 2006), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/old/mpep_E8R5.htm (naming the TSM test as an 
essential part of a prima facie case of obviousness) with MPEP, supra note 25, § 2143 (“Note 
that the list of rationales provided is not intended to be an all-inclusive list. Other rationales to 
support a conclusion of obviousness may be relied upon by Office personnel.”). 
76. See Underweiser, supra note 68, at 271–76 (summarizing post-KSR decisions by the 
PTAB evidencing an effective presumption of combinability); Miller, supra note 63, at 239 
(concluding that the new obviousness standards from KSR create a presumption that inventions 
that combine prior art elements are obvious). 
77. See supra notes 53-54, 75-76 and accompanying text. 
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evidence from the market and industry, called objective indicia, to 
help determine whether an invention was obvious.78 Objective indicia 
reflect actual conditions in a particular field, rather than a fact-
finder’s view of the field constructed from a few prior art documents 
or his own perception of inventiveness.79 When a patent seems 
obvious based on the record of prior art, objective indicia can be used 
as evidence on the other side of the scale to show that the invention 
was not in fact obvious to skilled persons at the time.80 Examples of 
secondary indicia include: long felt but unsolved need, commercial 
success of an invention, the failure of others to make an invention, 
and prior skepticism in the field or industry.81 
 Although the Federal Circuit claims that objective indicia can 
be the most important evidence concerning obviousness, objective 
indicia rarely overcome a prima facia case of obviousness based on 
combinations of prior art.82 This may partly be due to the fact that the 
legal rules for considering objective indicia are less developed than 
the rules for considering prior art.83 Further complicating objective 

78. See MPEP, supra note 25, § 2141 (guiding examiners to consider all of the Graham 
factors when deciding obviousness, including secondary considerations); Transocean Offshore 
Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (ruling that “a district court must always consider any objective evidence of non-
obviousness presented in a case.”).  
79. See Wieker, supra note 51, at 681 (2008) (suggesting that secondary indicia be given 
increased importance after KSR to avoid subjective judgments by courts); Thomas, supra note 
35, at 2104–05 (suggesting that patents in the mechanical arts are more likely to be found 
invalid because they are better understood by judges, and that secondary indicia could be used 
to counter the trend against obviousness findings in the mechanical arts). 
80. See Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1305 (reversing a district court determination of 
obviousness based on evidence from secondary considerations); Patently Non-Obvious I, 
supra note 22, at 1422 (summarizing an overview of cases from 2004-05, and concluding that 
very few were decided based on secondary considerations). 
81. See Thomas, supra note 35, at 2077–79 (discussing the different secondary indicia 
considered in US courts and the rationale behind each); Durie Lemley, supra note 16, at 1004 
(listing different secondary considerations); Wieker, supra note 51, at 675 (listing the most 
common secondary considerations). 
82. Compare Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLC, 683 F.3d 1356, 1367  
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 
1983)) (“evidence of secondary considerations may often be the most probative and cogent 
evidence in the record.”), with Thomas, supra note 35, at 2085 (summarizing post-KSR 
Federal Circuit cases involving secondary considerations and determining that “secondary 
considerations were virtually never sufficient” to overcome a finding of obviousness based on 
the first three Graham factors), and Durie & Lemley, supra note 16, at 997 (“If the other 
Graham factors are sufficiently persuasive, the Federal Circuit has been willing to dismiss the 
potential impact of secondary considerations.”). 
83. See Durie & Lemley, supra note 16, at 996–97 (noting that the Federal Circuit has 
not clearly defined the role of secondary considerations in determining obviousness of 
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indicia analysis is the fact that there are often high standards of proof 
to show a nexus between the evidence of objective indicia and non-
obviousness.84 This has not stopped some commentators from 
recommending increased use of objective indicia to help decision 
makers counteract hindsight, particularly in the wake of KSR.85 This 
change need not present much additional work for the USPTO, 
because most objective indicia favor applicants, and applicants could 
be relied on to find their own evidence of secondary indicia.86 
C. Inventive Step in the EPO 
 Patents in Europe may be obtained through the EPO, which 
conducts a single examination and issues a separate patent for each 
contracting state.87 The EPO assesses inventive step using the 
“Problem-Solution” approach.88 This approach involves three steps: 
(1) finding the most promising starting point, or “closest prior art;” 
(2) identifying the “objective technical problem” solved by the 
invention; and (3) deciding whether the invention would have been 
obvious to a PHOSITA trying to solve the objective technical 

patents); Thomas, supra note 35, at 2106–07 (suggesting that the Federal Circuit could provide 
better guidance to lower courts on how to consider secondary considerations, and that this 
would make them more important in decisions). 
84. See Wieker, supra note 51 at 676–78 (reviewing the proof necessary to show that 
commercial success and long-felt need are actually related to inventiveness); Thomas, supra 
note 35, at 2090–93 (noting the difficulty of proving a nexus to obviousness from commercial 
success or professional praise). 
85. Wieker, supra note 51, at 666 (suggesting that secondary considerations be given 
increased consideration after KSR to ground obviousness decisions); Thomas, supra note 35, 
at 2102 (suggesting that the Federal Circuit give more attention to secondary considerations 
after KSR). 
86. See Durie & Lemley, supra note 16, at 1004–05 (noting that most objective criteria 
help applicants/patentees while their absence does not weigh against validity, and that only one 
kind of objective criteria supports obviousness); Thomas, supra note 35, at 2077 (noting that 
the presence of most objective indicia weigh against finding obviousness). 
87. See NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION, EUROPEAN 
PATENT OFFICE, http://www.epo.org/applying/european/Guide-for-applicants/html/e/ga_a_ii.
html (last visited Oct. 23, 2014) (summarizing the function of the EPO and listing contracting 
states). 
88. See EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 25, pt. G, ch. VII, at 3 (“In order to assess 
inventive step in an objective and predictable manner, the so-called "problem-and-solution 
approach" should be applied.”); AIPPI GERMANY GROUP REPORT, supra note 23, at 6 (stating 
that the EPO applies the problem-solution approach to determine inventive step). 
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problem from step two, and starting from closest prior art from step 
one.89 
1. Closest Prior Art 
 In the EPO, the “closest prior art” serves as the benchmark of 
comparison against which the invention is evaluated for inventive 
step.90 Although the criteria for selecting the closest prior art in the 
EPO are similar to those for defining analogous art in the United 
States — the problems addressed by the prior art and the technical 
field of the invention — there is not an equivalent single benchmark 
of prior art in the United States.91 
i. Same Purpose or Effect 
 In order to evaluate inventive step in an objective way, the 
closest prior art needs to lead a PHOSITA facing the objective 
technical problem to the invention.92 To be chosen as the closest prior 
art, a prior art reference should be “directed to the same purpose or 
effect” as the patent or application.93  The formulation of problems 
does not need to be identical, but must be similar enough that a 

89. See EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 25, pt. G, ch. VII, at 3 (describing the three stages 
of the problem-solution approach to evaluating inventive step); AIPPI NETHERLANDS GROUP 
REPORT, supra note 19, at 7 (listing the steps of the problem-solution approach as applied at 
the EPO). 
90. See EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 25, pt. G, ch. VII, at 3 (“The closest prior art is that 
which in one single reference discloses the combination of features which constitutes the most 
promising starting point for an obvious development leading to the invention.”); CASE LAW OF 
THE BOA, supra note 14, at 169 (describing the closest prior art as whichever reference is the 
promising starting point to reach the invention). 
91. Compare supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text, with EPO GUIDELINES, supra 
note 25, pt. G, ch. VII, at 3 (naming a similar purpose, effect or technical field as the most 
important criteria for selecting the closest prior art), and CASE LAW OF THE BOA, supra note 
14, at 168 (stating that shared technical features and being designed to solve similar problems 
are the often the most important criteria for selecting which reference is the closest prior art). 
92. See CASE LAW OF THE BOA, supra note 14, at 168 (claiming that prior art with a 
different purpose cannot be the closest prior art because it would not lead to the invention); 
EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 25, pt. G, VII, at 3 (formulating inventive step analysis as 
starting from the perspective of a PHOSITA using the closest prior art to solve the objective 
technical problem). 
93. See Case T-0327/92 of the Technical Boards of Appeal of the EPO, at 17 (April 22, 
1997) (“[A] document may not qualify as closest prior art to an invention merely because of 
similarity in the composition of the products, its suitability for the desired use of the invention 
also had to be described.”); Case T-1519/08 of the Technical Boards of Appeal of the EPO, at 
12–14 (Dec. 16, 2011) (rejecting two prior art references as the closest prior art because 
despite other similarities, they addressed different problems than the patent). 
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PHOSITA would relate one problem to the finding of a solution to the 
other.94  
ii. Most Promising Starting Point 
 Once prior art with the same or a similar purpose is identified, 
the closest prior art is chosen based on which document constitutes 
the most promising starting point to reach the invention in question.95 
This will, in many cases, be the prior art with the fewest structural 
and functional differences from the invention.96 No matter how 
structurally and functionally similar a reference is to an invention, it 
still needs to have the same purpose as the invention to be used as the 
closest prior art.97 In addition to the problem addressed and structural 
and functional similarities, the field of the invention can be an 
additional factor supporting a choice for the closest prior art if 
necessary.98  
2. Objective Technical Problem 
 The problem faced by the PHOSITA is used as the motivation 
for his search through the prior art and his combinations and 
modifications of prior art.99 The EPO uses a particular formulation of 

94. See Case T 0327/92 at 17–18 (declining to use a reference as closest prior art despite 
many similar features because the reference did not suggest a similar purpose); CASE LAW OF 
THE BOA, supra note 14, at 168 (stating that the purpose of an invention is more important 
than structural similarities when choosing the closest prior art). 
95. See CASE LAW OF THE BOA, supra note 14, at 169-70 (characterizing the closest 
prior art as the “most promising springboard” or the “most promising starting point” from 
which a skilled person might reach the invention); Case T 0452/05 of the Technical Boards of 
Appeal of the EPO, at 14–15 (Aug. 30, 2006) (choosing the closest prior art based on the prior 
art reference that came closest to solving the problem of the invention). 
96. See CASE LAW OF THE BOA, supra note 14, at 168 (claiming that the closest prior art 
will usually be the reference that requires the fewest structural and functional changes to reach 
the invention in question); EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 25, pt. G, ch. VII, at 3 (“in practice, 
the closest prior art is generally that which corresponds to a similar use and requires the 
minimum of structural and functional modifications to arrive at the claimed invention”). 
97. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.  
98. See Case T 0095/92 of the Technical Boards of Appeal of the EPO, at 8 (Aug. 9, 
1994) (citing a similar technical field to support the choice of closest prior art); AIPPI 
NETHERLANDS REPORT, supra note 19, at 4 (claiming that the closest prior art should be in the 
same or a similar technical field as the invention). 
99. See AIPPI GERMANY GROUP REPORT, supra note 23, at question 14 (noting that the 
PHOSITA is assumed to be dealing with the objective technical problem and trying to find a 
solution to it); CASE LAW OF THE BOA, supra note 14, at 165 (stating that in the 
problem/solution approach the skilled person starts with the objective technical problem in 
mind); EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 25, pt. G, ch. VII, at 3 (formulating inventive step 
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the problem called the “objective technical problem.”100 The objective 
technical problem looks to the technical effects of the invention as 
compared to the closest prior art to define the problem that the 
invention solves.101 The European Patent Convention (“EPC”) 
requires the originally filed patent application to identify both the 
problem that the invention solves as well as the invention’s particular 
solution.102 The patent application is usually taken as the starting 
point in formulating the objective technical problem, although the 
problem will be changed and reformulated if the strict criteria of the 
objective technical problem are not met.103 
 The EPO requires that an invention actually solve the 
objective technical problem, and will reformulate the objective 
technical problem based on the actual effectiveness of the invention if 
there is no evidence that the problem is solved.104 An applicant may 

analysis as starting from the perspective of a PHOSITA using the closest prior art to solve the 
objective technical problem). 
100. See AIPPI NETHERLANDS GROUP REPORT, supra note 19, at 6–7 (discussing a 
question about the inventor’s problem in terms of the objective technical problem); CASE LAW 
OF THE BOA, supra note 14, at 165 (defining the problem/solution approach with the 
PHOSITA using the objective technical problem as a starting point). 
101. See AIPPI NETHERLANDS GROUP REPORT, supra note 19, at 6–7 (explaining that 
the objective technical problem is based on the success of the invention compared to prior art 
inventions); EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 25, pt. G, ch. VII, at 4 (instructing that the objective 
technical problem is based on the “technical effect” of the invention’s improvements). 
102. See Implementing Regulations to Convention on the Grant of European Patents, 
Rule 42(1)(c), Oct. 5, 1973 (requiring that the description of a patent “disclose the invention, 
as claimed, in such terms that the technical problem . . . and its solution can be understood, and 
state any advantageous effects of the invention with reference to the background art”); CASE 
LAW OF THE BOA, supra note 14, at 177 (explaining the requirement that the objective 
technical problem, whether reformulated or not, must be derivable from the patent 
application). 
103. See AIPPI NETHERLANDS REPORT, supra note 19, at 7 (claiming that the 
formulation of the objective technical problem starts from the description in the patent 
application); CASE LAW OF THE BOA, supra note 14, at 176 (summarizing case law that uses 
the written description of a patent application as the basis of forming the objective technical 
problem, except in cases where that formulation was not supported by other evidence). 
104. See EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 25, pt. G, ch. VII, at 3-5 (stating that the problem 
as formulated in a patent application may need to be reformulated based on evidence of the 
invention’s effectiveness); Case T 0258/05 of the Technical Boards of Appeal of the EPO, at 
13 (June 21, 2007) (rejecting the problem as stated in the patent application because there was 
not evidence that it solved the problem by offering an improvement over the closest prior art); 
Case T 0355/97 of the Technical Boards of Appeal of the EPO, at 11-12 (July 5, 2000) 
(rejecting a patentee’s statement of the objective problem because experimental evidence did 
not show that the invention solved the problem); id. at 8-11 (finding that evidence submitted 
by a patentee did not support the patentee’s claimed problem of improving the production rate 
of a chemical compound while maintaining purity  while  because the submissions only 
showed improvement of the performance index, but did not show that selectivity had been 
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also amend the claims to a scope commensurate with the 
demonstrated effects of the invention to avoid reformulation.105  
 If there is no evidence that the invention represents an 
improvement over the prior art, the reformulation of the objective 
technical problem may be simply “the provision of an alternative 
product, process or method.” 106 This reformulation can make it easier 
to find that an invention lacks inventive step, because a more focused 
problem would focus a PHOSITA’s efforts, while simply finding an 
alternative means would lead the PHOSITA to consider a wider range 
of prior art.107 
3. The Could/Would Approach 
 After identifying the closest prior art and formulating the 
objective technical problem, the test for inventive step under the EPC 
asks whether the invention would have been obvious to a PHOSITA 
before the date of filing.108 The EPO emphasizes the use of the word 

maintained); Case T 0824/07 of the Technical Boards of Appeal of the EPO, at 9-12 (Oct. 5, 
2007) (reformulating the applicant’s objective technical problem because the evidence did not 
show improvement over the closest prior art across all possible material compositions). 
105. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 123, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 ILM 
268 (giving applicants “at least one opportunity to amend the application of [their] own 
volition.”); Implementing Regulations of the Convention on the Grant of European Patents 
Rule 137, 161, Oct. 5 1973; Case T 1694/10 of the Technical Boards of Appeal of the EPO, at 
2–3 (Jan. 25, 2013) (summarizing the four different versions of a claim presented for 
examination by a patentee in an opposition proceeding). 
106. EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 25, pt. G, ch. VII, at 4; see Case T 0355/97, at 11-12 
(reformulating the problem motivating a patent from improving the speed of a chemical 
preparation, to “providing merely a further method for preparing” the chemical); Case T 
0258/05, at 9–13 (redefining the objective technical problem for a hair conditioner from 
increasing hair volume to “[providing] further hair conditioning compositions” because there 
was no experimental evidence showing that the claimed invention actually increased hair 
volume better than prior art). 
107. See Case T 0355/97 at 12–13 (finding a patent obvious after reformulating the 
problem to be finding an alternate method, and concluding that “the person skilled in the art 
seeking to solve the less ambitious problem . . . of providing merely a further preparation 
process, [would] consider routinely any conceivable modification of that known process . . . he 
would not ignore document (5)”); Case T 0611/07 of the Technical Boards of Appeal of the 
EPO, at 12–13 (Sept. 18, 2009) (finding a patent non-inventive after redefining the objective 
technical problem to finding an alternative method). 
108. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 56, Oct. 5, 1973 (“An 
invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, having regard to the state of the 
art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art. If the state of the art also includes documents 
within the meaning of Article 54, paragraph 3, these documents shall not be considered in 
deciding whether there has been an inventive step.”). Article 54, paragraph 2 includes 
“everything made available to the public . . . before the date of filing” as prior art, and 
paragraph 3 also includes other patent applications which were filed before, but published 
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would as opposed to could, summarizing the distinction as follows: 
“the point is not whether the skilled person could have arrived at the 
invention by adapting or modifying the closest prior art, but whether 
he would have done so because the prior art incited him to do so in 
the hope of solving the objective technical problem.”109 By asking 
what a PHOSITA would have done, the EPO requires that a reason in 
the prior art exist for the PHOSITA to use, modify, or combine prior 
art references.110 
  Addressing the same or a similar problem is a key 
consideration that would lead a PHOSITA to look to a prior art 
reference, and if a prior art document addresses a different problem 
than the invention it can be precluded from being asserted against a 
patent, even if it has similar features.111 A PHOSITA can also be 
motivated to combine references if the references are from similar 
technical fields as the invention, and the relation of the fields would 
cause a PHOSITA to look to a neighboring field for solutions to the 
problem.112 General technical knowledge, which is common to a field 

after, the filing date as prior art for purposes of novelty. Id. at art. 54. Article 56 excludes 
paragraph 3 prior art from the consideration of inventive step, so inventive step analysis takes 
place from a pre-filing perspective. Id. at art. 56.  
109. See EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 25, pt. G, ch. VII, at 5. 
110. See Case T 0414/98 of the Technical Boards of Appeal of the EPO, at 15 (Nov. 30, 
2009) (stating that there must be “hints or clues” leading to the invention in the prior art in 
order to show a lack of inventive step); AIPPI NETHERLANDS GROUP REPORT, supra note 19, 
at 4 (describing the EPO approach to combining prior art references as requiring a motivation 
to combine, except in the case of common general knowledge represented by textbooks or 
dictionaries). 
111. See Case T 0218/07 of the Technical Boards of Appeal of the EPO, at 8–9 (Dec. 11, 
2008) (holding that a prior art document with similar features did not render the patent in suit 
obvious because the document addressed a different problem than the invention, and would 
therefore not lead a PHOSITA to use the teaching of that prior art to solve his problem); Case 
T 1519/08 of the Technical Boards of Appeal of the EPO, at 18 (Dec. 16, 2011) (concluding 
that a PHOSITA would not have combined prior art documents to reach the invention because 
the documents were addressed to different problems than the invention). 
112. See Case T 0095/92 of the Technical Boards of Appeal of the EPO, at 13 (Aug. 9, 
2004) (deciding that a PHOSITA working in the “field of security checks on bank notes must 
be presumed to be aware of the techniques employed in the field of tape recorders insofar as 
these employ the same basic principles of detection” because a prior art document discussed 
the applicability of the latter art to the former); Case T 0516/08 of the Technical Boards of 
Appeal of the EPO, at 11 (Dec. 16, 2009) (holding that a PHOSITA would use a prior art 
document not directed towards the same problem, but in the same field as the invention). But 
see Case T 1479/08 of the Technical Boards of Appeal of the EPO, at 9-11 (May 3, 2011) 
(concluding that a PHOSITA would not look to two prior art documents disclosing similar 
methods to the patent in suit because they were from unrelated fields and did not address 
themselves to similar problems as the invention). 
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of art, can easily be combined with other prior art, and need only be 
cited if challenged.113  
Prior art documents need to be technically compatible with each 
other for a PHOSITA to consider combining their teachings into one 
solution to the problem, because otherwise their incompatibility 
would lead a PHOSITA away from combining them.114 As with 
combining prior art, the PHOSITA needs a motivation from the prior 
art to modify a single prior art reference to reach an invention.115 
4. Secondary Indicators in the EPO 
  Secondary indicators in the EPO are the equivalent of 
objective indicia in the United States, and can include commercial 
success, skepticism, long-felt need, and unexpected results.116 In the 
EPO, secondary indicators cannot replace the technical analysis of 
inventive step detailed above, but they can reinforce other findings or 
tip the scales in a close case.117 An important feature of secondary 

113. See generally EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 25, pt. G, ch. VII  (outlining the use of 
common general knowledge in the EPO); CASE LAW OF THE BOA, supra note 14, at 74-75 
(discussing evidence needed to support general knowledge). 
114. Case T 1629/08 of the Technical Boards of Appeal of the EPO, at 9 (Sept. 21, 2010) 
(holding that a PHOSITA would not use a prior art document because its teaching was 
incompatible with the closest prior art); Case T 0447/06 of the Technical Boards of Appeal of 
the EPO, at 26 (Sept. 10, 2008) (holding that a PHOSITA would not have reached the 
invention by combining prior art reference with the closest prior art because the method 
disclosed by the reference, while effective in some respects, was known to have other 
undesirable effects incompatible with the goals of the invention). 
115. See Case T 1519/08 of the Technical Boards of Appeal of the EPO, at 17–18 (Dec. 
16, 2011) (concluding that, because there was no motivation or incentive to do so, a PHOSITA 
would not have changed an important feature of a single prior art document to arrive at the 
invention); CASE LAW OF THE BOA, supra note 14, at 182–83 (stating that a PHOSITA needs 
some prompting or expectation of advantages based in the prior art to render an invention 
obvious). 
116. See supra note 81 and accompanying text; AIPPI NETHERLANDS REPORT, supra 
note 19, at 10–11 (explaining the use of secondary considerations in the EPO); CASE LAW OF 
THE BOA, supra note 14, at 224–29 (reviewing EPO case law on secondary indicators, 
organized by each type of evidence); EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 25, pt. G, ch. VII, at 9-10 
(reciting secondary considerations used in the EPO). 
117. See CASE LAW OF THE BOA, supra note 14, at 223–24 (explaining that secondary 
indicia are of secondary importance to the problem/solution approach for determining the 
presence of inventive step); Case T 1397/07 of the Technical Boards of Appeal of the EPO, at 
20–21 (May 6, 2010) (restating the rule that secondary indicia cannot support inventive step 
alone, and upholding the decision that the invention lacked inventive step despite evidence of 
commercial success); Case T 0677/91 of the Technical Boards of Appeal of the EPO, at 16 
(Nov. 3, 1992) (relying on commercial success and praise of the invention’s advantages as a 
breakthrough invention to support finding inventive step). 
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indicator evidence is that the evidence must not be caused by some 
influence other than the technical features of the invention, and may 
require high standards of proof to be taken as evidence of 
inventiveness.118 
II. HINDSIGHT IS 20/10 
 Part II compares how the law of the United States and the 
EPO are vulnerable to hindsight bias, and how each patent system 
attempts to address hindsight bias in its legal tests. Part II evaluates 
and compares each part of the inventive step analysis, first with the 
starting point in the prior art, then with the definition of the inventor’s 
problem, the process of modifying and combining prior art references, 
and finally with the objective indicia and secondary considerations. It 
is important to remember that US Courts, the USPTO, and the EPO 
acknowledge that hindsight is an unacceptable basis for a patent 
examination or validity decision.119  
A. Starting Point in the Prior Art, The Benchmark of Comparison 
  This part of the inventive step analysis is where a PHOSITA 
would start the inventive process given the problems he faced and is 
where a patent examiner or a court actually begins its analysis of 
inventive step or obviousness. It is the benchmark against which the 
invention is judged. The danger of hindsight here is that an examiner 
may be led by the invention to a starting point that would not have 
been obvious to a PHOSITA given the problems faced.120 
 The EPO usually selects a single closest prior art reference 
that serves as the starting point.121 This is selected first based on 
having the same purpose as the invention, with structural and 

118. See CASE LAW OF THE BOA, supra note 14, at 228 (noting that commercial success 
must be caused by technical features, not effective marketing or advertising); id. at 224 (noting 
high standards of proof to show “technical prejudice” against an invention); id. at 227 (noting 
the need to prove the existence of a long-felt need or desire to improve a technology); AIPPI 
NETHERLANDS REPORT, supra note 19, at 10–11 (explaining the need for proof of secondary 
considerations in the EPO). 
119. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
120. AIPPI GERMANY GROUP REPORT, supra note 23, at question 28 (referring to a 
German decision criticizing the choice of closest prior art in the EPO as influenced by 
hindsight knowledge of the nature of the invention); EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 25, pt. G, 
ch. VII at 8 (cautioning examiners that references found in a prior art search are found with 
“foreknowledge of what matter constitutes the alleged invention”). 
121. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
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functional similarities used to select among prior art with similar 
purposes.122 Selecting the closest prior art primarily based on its 
purpose helps examiners avoid hindsight that might be present if the 
closest prior art were selected based primarily on structural 
similarities.123 Using structural and functional similarities to select the 
closest prior art can be prone to hindsight because the structure and 
function of an invention are only determined once it has been 
developed and a particular structure may not have been obvious at 
first.124 Despite these risks of hindsight the method of selecting of the 
closest prior art in the EPO is justified by other concerns. It is 
acceptable for the EPO to choose a prior art reference that the 
inventor did not consider a promising starting point because a patent 
must be inventive with respect to the starting point that a PHOSITA 
would have used, not just what the inventor actually used as a starting 
point.125 
 In the United States, examiners will often refer to a prior art 
reference as “primary” when it has the most features in common with 
the invention, and other combined references will be referred to as 
“secondary,” “tertiary,” and so on.126 These designations, however, 
are for convenience and have no legal significance, and any 

122. See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text. 
123. See Case T 0246/04 of the Technical Boards of Appeal of the EPO, at 50–51 (July 
12, 2007) (“in order to avoid ex-post facto considerations, the closest state of the art is not 
generally that merely showing superficially the most similarities, but rather that conceived for 
solving the same primary problem or aiming at the same objective as the claimed invention 
and which requires the minimum of structural and functional modifications”); CASE LAW OF 
THE BOA, supra note 14, at 169 (reviewing cases where a reference could not be used as the 
closest prior art because it did not address a similar problem as the invention, and concluding 
that hindsight must have been used to select such references as the closest prior art). 
124. AIPPI GERMANY GROUP REPORT, supra note 23, at question 28 (referring to a 
German decision criticizing the choice of closest prior art in the EPO as influenced by 
hindsight knowledge of the nature of the invention); Case T 0246/04 at 50–51 (explaining that 
the importance of a similar purpose to the selection of closest prior art is meant to avoid 
hindsight). 
125. See CASE LAW OF THE BOA, supra note 14, at 167 (“The determination of the 
closest prior art is therefore an objective and not a subjective exercise.”); see Eisenberg, supra 
note 44, at 897–98 (arguing that PHOSITAs in many instances should be taken to have 
knowledge beyond just that disclosed in the prior art); EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 25, pt. G, 
ch. VII, at 1 (stating that a PHOSITA is presumed to have general knowledge in the field and 
be aware of all prior art revealed in the search report). 
126. See, e.g., Ex parte Wheeler, No. 2012-002215, 2013 WL 5866443 at *8 (P.T.A.B. 
Oct. 29, 2013) (referring to a combination of primary, secondary, tertiary, and quartinary 
references); Ex parte Kim, No. 2011-012867, 2013 WL 3355940 at *5–7 (P.T.A.B. June 10, 
2013) (discussing combinations of primary, secondary, and tertiary prior art references). 
2014] HINDSIGHT BIAS IN PATENT LAW 1813 
analogous prior art can be the basis of an obviousness argument.127 
Ignoring the inventor’s state of mind, and using any prior art that a 
PHOSITA might have used as the benchmark of comparison, is 
justified in the United States by a concern for objectivity, as it is in 
Europe.128 
B. The Problem an Inventor is Trying to Fix 
 When trying to determine what a PHOSITA would have done, 
it is important to consider the PHOSITA’s motivations when making 
inventions, and both the United States and the EPO use problems in 
the prior art as the motivation for a PHOSITA’s work.129 The 
formulation of this problem, however, differs significantly between 
the United States and Europe. 
 The EPO takes a very rigid approach to forming the 
inventor’s problem, and bases its formulation on the effects of the 
finished invention.130 The EPO’s rigid approach to defining the 
objective technical problem is based on concerns that the problem be 
defined in an objective manner, and not in a way specific to a 
particular inventor.131 The EPO addresses this objectivity problem by 

127. See, e.g., In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citations omitted) 
(“[W]here the relevant factual inquiries underlying an obviousness determination are otherwise 
clear, characterization by the examiner of prior art as ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ is merely a 
matter of presentation with no legal significance.”); Ex parte Wheeler, 2013 WL 5866443 at 
*15 (explaining that the combination of references and features is important, not how they are 
characterized as primary, secondary, or tertiary and so on). 
128. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
129. See KSR Int’l v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007) (explaining that any need 
or problem known in the field of art can motivate the PHOSITA to combine features found in 
the prior art); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (reasoning that the similarity 
of problems addressed by prior art would lead a PHOSITA to consider many kinds of hinges 
and fittings analogous to laptop computer hinges); EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 25, pt. G, ch. 
VII, at 4 (describing the objective technical problem as the “aim and task” making an 
improvement over the prior art). Compare supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text, with 
supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
130. See supra notes 99–105 and accompanying text. 
131. See Case T 0039/93 of the Technical Boards of Appeal of the EPO, at 14–15 (Feb. 
14, 1996) (defining the subjective technical problem as the problem understood by the patent 
applicant and disclosed in the patent application, and contrasting it with the objective technical 
problem which is based on “objectively relevant elements” that may have been beyond the 
consideration of the applicant); CASE LAW OF THE BOA, supra note 14, at 166 (defining the 
technical problem as an objective finding, defined in terms of the inventor’s demonstrated 
advances over prior art techniques). 
1814 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1787 
basing the inventor’s problem on the actual effects of the invention.132 
The formulation of the objective technical problem can incorporate 
hindsight into the EPO’s approach because it uses the invention (ex 
post information) to define the problem that motivates an invention’s 
development (an ex ante fact).133 The EPO is not unaware of the 
potential for hindsight in the formulation of the objective technical 
problem, and EPO materials admonish examiners against forming the 
objective technical problem in a way that points to the solution.134 
 The approach to the inventor’s problem in the United States is 
quite different because the USPTO and courts in the United States can 
use any problem that was recognized in the field at the time of 
invention as motivation for a PHOSITA.135 Like the EPO, the USPTO 
is not limited to using the problem as defined by an inventor in his 
application, so concerns with subjectively defining the problem are 
still addressed with the US approach.136 These two methods of 
formulating the problem are quite different because the US method  
puts the focus squarely on ex ante facts about what problems were 
motivating people at the time the invention was developed and away 
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132. See Case T 1621/08 of the Technical Boards of Appeal of the EPO, at 18 (Sept. 17, 
2010) (refusing to use the problem as proposed by the patentee because there was no evidence 
that the invention achieved a solution to that problem); supra notes 99–105 and accompanying 
text.  
133. See AIPPI NETHERLANDS GROUP REPORT, supra note 19, at 12 (referring to a 
Dutch court decision that criticized the EPO’s method of identifying the objective technical 
problem); CASE LAW OF THE BOA, supra note 14, at 176 (admitting that the formulation of the 
objective technical problem can contain pointers to the solution, and warning against such 
formulations as hindsight). 
134. See CASE LAW OF THE BOA, supra note 14, at 176 (summarizing case law deciding 
that “the technical problem addressed by an invention had to be formulated in such a way that 
it did not contain pointers to the solution or partially anticipate the solution”); EPO 
GUIDELINES, supra note 25, pt. G, ch. VII, at 4 (“[T]he objective technical problem must be so 
formulated as not to contain pointers to the technical solution . . . .”).  
135. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 420 (“any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at 
the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the 
elements in the manner claimed.”); Norgen Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 699 F.3d 1317, 1326–
27 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (upholding a finding of obviousness based on a problem identified in the 
prior art that would lead a PHOSITA to the claimed invention); MPEP supra note 25, 
§ 2141.01(a). 
136. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 420 (“The first error of the Court of Appeals in this case was 
to foreclose this reasoning by holding that courts and patent examiners should look only to the 
problem the patentee was trying to solve.”); Norgen, 699 F.3d at 1323 (explaining that any 
problem known in the industry can motivate a combination of prior art, including, but not 
limited to the problem motivating the patentee). 
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from ex post constructions based on the invention as is typically done 
in the EPO.137  
C. Modifying and Combining Prior Art 
 Modifications and combinations of prior art are where 
everything comes together in a determination of obviousness. 
Through the analogous art test, and the many rationales for combining 
prior art, the United States uses both the field of art and the problem 
faced by the inventor as justifications to combine prior art.138 The 
EPO uses the same justifications to combine in the could/would 
approach.139  
 The EPO  Guidelines address the issue of hindsight bias most 
directly in the context of combining the prior art.140 The EPO attempts 
to minimize the hindsight involved in using prior art that was found in 
a search conducted with knowledge of the invention by requiring a 
reason to show why a PHOSITA would have combined references.141 
As in the United States, implicit motivation and general knowledge, 
as well as explicit mention of a similar problem, can provide 
sufficient motivation for an examiner to combine prior art and render 
a patent obvious.142 This makes the assessment of combinability 
essentially the same in the United States as in the EPO: references 
from the same field or addressing similar problems will probably be 
combined to show obviousness. 

137. See supra notes 99–105, 133–36 and accompanying text. 
138. See supra notes 53–56, 75–77 and accompanying text. 
139. See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text. 
140. See CASE LAW OF THE BOA, supra note 14, at 184 (warning that the risk of ex post 
facto analysis is particularly high with inventions that combine elements from different prior 
art references); EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 25, pt. G, ch. VII, at 8 (warning examiners that 
“the documents produced in the search have, of necessity, been obtained with foreknowledge 
of what matter constitutes the alleged invention . . . . [And that examiners] should attempt to 
visualize the overall state of the art” including negative teachings). 
141. See CASE LAW OF THE BOA, supra note 14, at 183 (summarizing how the 
“could/would approach” is meant to avoid “ex post facto” analysis of patents and 
applications); EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 25, pt. G, ch. VII, at 5 (emphasizing the difference 
between what a PHOSITA could have done, and what he would actually have done, given 
motivation to improve what was found in the prior art). 
142. See Case T 0257/98 of the Technical Boards of Appeal of the EPO, at 17 (Sept. 3, 
2002) (incorporating an implicit teaching from a prior art reference as a motivation for a 
PHOSITA into a holding of obviousness); Case T 0412/09 of the Technical Boards of Appeal 
of the EPO, at 11 (May 9, 2012) (combining the closest prior art with “common general 
knowledge” to find a claim obvious). 
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 There is, however, an important difference between the 
approaches in the two systems. EPO patent rejections based on lack of 
inventive step are usually based on a combination of only two prior 
art references, and, with a few limited exceptions, the need to 
combine more than two references can tend to show inventiveness 
instead of obviousness.143 The EPO even warns its examiners that 
prior art references found in a patent office search are particularly 
vulnerable to hindsight because the search is based on knowledge of 
the invention.144 Practice in the USPTO is different, where 
combinations of three or four prior art references are common.145 
D. Objective Indicia 
 Outside evidence like objective indicia or secondary 
indicators could provide a helpful check on hindsight in patent 
decisions. Both the USPTO and the EPO will consider objective 
indicia if it is brought before an examiner. Neither office, however, 
gives this evidence much weight when compared with the other parts 
of the inventive step/obviousness analysis. The EPO is 
straightforward with the fact that objective indicia are not as 
important as the problem-solution approach, and can only tip the 
scales in close cases.146  By contrast, the Federal Circuit has claimed 
that objective indicia can be the most important evidence of 
obviousness, but rarely makes a decision based on objective 
indicia.147 The range of secondary indicators considered is similar in 
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143. See AIPPI NETHERLANDS GROUP REPORT, supra note 19, at 5–6 (explaining that 
more than two references can show an inventive step, and explaining the exceptions to that 
rule); EPO GUIDELINES, supra note 25, pt. G, ch. VII, at 7 (“[T]he fact that more than one 
disclosure must be combined with the closest prior art in order to arrive at a combination of 
features may be an indication of the presence of an inventive step . . . .”); AIPPI GERMANY 
GROUP REPORT, supra note 23, at question 12 (noting that combining more than one reference 
with the closest prior art can signal the presence of an inventive step). 
144. See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text.  
145. See supra note 126; see also, e.g., Ex parte Laborbe, No. 2011-004895, 2013 WL 
3323585 at *3-4 (P.T.A.B. May 23, 2013) (upholding rejections based on combining more 
than two prior art documents); Ex parte Decesare, No. 2011-008327, 2012 WL 5772507 at *5 
(P.T.A.B. Nov. 14, 2012) (upholding an examiner’s rejection of a claim “as obvious over 
Allardyce, as evidenced by D'Ottavio, and further in view of the admitted state of the prior art, 
Okuhama and Pender, and further in view of Stevens”). 
146. See CASE LAW OF THE BOA, supra note 14, at 223–24 (“Secondary indicia of this 
kind are only of importance in cases of doubt . . . .”); Case T 0465/97 of the Technical Boards 
of Appeal of the EPO, at 28 (Mar. 14, 2001) (“[S]econdary indicia like a prejudice in the art 
are merely ‘auxiliary considerations’ in the assessment of inventive step . . . .”). 
147. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
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both systems, as is the need for proof of a connection to 
inventiveness.148 
 Hindsight bias can enter into the inventive step analysis at 
many stages. The choice of a benchmark prior art reference can 
incorporate hindsight if it is based on the structure of the invention 
without reference to what people in the field thought was a promising 
starting point. Similarly, hindsight exists where the formulation of the 
problem motivating an inventor is based on the achievements of the 
invention without being grounded in what were actually recognized as 
problems at the time of invention. Combinations of features in prior 
art may seem obvious once proven successful only because the 
invention proved them successful. Finally, objective indicia and 
secondary considerations can provide a useful counter-balance to the 
temptation of hindsight, but are not given very much weight by the 
USPTO or EPO systems. 
   III. IMPROVEMENTS VIA TRANS-ATLANTIC SHARING  
 Part III recommends improvements to each component of 
inventive step analysis based on the insights gained from comparing 
the EPO and US practices. Specifically, the EPO should adopt the US 
approach to the inventor’s problem, and the United States and EPO 
should implement new procedures for combining prior art references. 
Both systems should also give increased weight and respect to 
objective indicia/secondary considerations in obviousness decisions. 
A. The Inventor’s Problem 
 The EPO should adopt the US approach to defining the 
problems faced by inventors by focusing on problems recognized in 
an industry before a patent is filed. While the general thrust of the 
inventor’s problem is usually fairly clear, the expression of that 
problem can point to the invention as a solution.149 This creates an 
issue of hindsight bias in the assessment of whether the invention is 
obvious, particularly with how the EPO forms the objective technical 

148. See supra notes 81, 84, 116–18 and accompanying text. 
149. See CASE LAW OF THE BOA, supra note 14, at 176 (admitting that the formulation 
of the objective technical problem can contain pointers to its solution, and warning against 
such formulations). 
1818 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:1787 
problem in a way that is based on the invention.150 Focusing on the 
state of the field of art before the invention and the alternate 
possibilities helps to correct the influence of hindsight in the analysis 
of the PHOSITA’s motivation.151 The rigid nature of the objective 
technical problem in the EPO is based on a concern for objectivity.152 
These concerns about relying on the “subjective” problem are 
addressed because any problem or demand that was known in the art 
can be used, and the problem actually present in an inventor’s mind is 
not given special treatment.153 By adopting the approach used in the 
United States, the EPO can address objectivity concerns and reduce 
the influence of hindsight by looking to recognized pre-invention 
problems. 
B. Combining Prior Art 
 To address problems of hindsight when combining prior art, 
this Note proposes implementing procedures requiring examiners to 
articulate reasons why any particular combination might not have 
been used by a PHOSITA. Developing reasons for alternative 
outcomes has been shown to help alleviate hindsight bias by moving 
the evaluator closer to a pre-knowledge mindset.154 Hindsight is a 
danger in this phase of inventive step analysis because it is easy for 
combinations of prior art to seem obvious once the desired outcome is 
known.155 Combinations of art are particularly vulnerable to hindsight 
because the prior art revealed by a prior art search is informed by the 
nature of the invention and its features.156 This problem is 
compounded in the United States by the use of three or more 

150. See AIPPI GERMANY REPORT, supra note 23, at question 15 (stating the importance 
of avoiding pointers to the solution to avoid ex post facto analysis); AIPPI NETHERLANDS 
REPORT, supra note 19, at 15 (noting the importance of forming the objective technical 
problem without pointers to the solution to making a hindsight free determination). 
151. See supra note 150 and accompanying text; Davies, supra note 42, at 92 (noting 
that considering alternative possibilities can reduce the effects of hindsight bias). 
152. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
153. See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text; KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 
U.S. 398, 420 (2007) (“[A]ny need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of 
invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the elements in the 
manner claimed.”); Norgren Inc. 699 F.3d 1317, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding a patent 
obvious because it was obvious in light of a long known problem in the industry). 
154. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
155. See supra notes 123–24, 141 and accompanying text. 
156. See supra notes 123–24, 141 and accompanying text. 
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references to show obviousness.157 Requiring examiners to articulate 
reasons in favor of and against each proposed prior art combination 
would help to put references in context, in addition to shifting the 
mental perspective of the examiner as demonstrated by psychological 
research.158 
C. Objective Indicia 
 Given that objective indicia reflect the real facts on the 
ground, not influenced by hindsight, their limited use and importance 
in obviousness decisions on both sides of the Atlantic is somewhat 
surprising.159 Both the United States and the EPO could both benefit 
from increased use and reliance on objective indicia, which are often, 
as the Federal Circuit has recognized, the most direct evidence of how 
a particular invention is viewed by experts in its field.160 The small 
weight given to objective indicia is perhaps because many objective 
indicia are complicated by potential confounding factors that must be 
ruled out before they can be accepted as evidence of inventiveness.161 
When these burdens of proof are met, both patent systems should give 
objective indicia and secondary considerations greater weight. In 
addition to giving these considerations more weight, clearer legal 
rules establishing the proof necessary to accept objective indicia as 
evidence of obviousness, and how they should be weighed in the 
whole obviousness analysis, would help examiners, courts, and 
practitioners to use and rely on objective indicia with confidence.162   
 CONCLUSION 
 It is easy in patent law to judge the achievements of the past 
from the vantage of the present, with the gift of hindsight. To be fair 
to the work of inventors and encourage innovation, it is important to 
avoid this pitfall. The legal systems in Europe and the United States 
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157. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
158. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
159. See Wieker, supra note 51, at 674 (noting that objective indicia can provide real 
world information about the circumstances of inventions); Thomas, supra note 35, at 2073 
(noting that objective indicia actual reflect industry conditions). 
160. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
161. See supra notes 83, 118 and accompanying text. 
162. See Wieker, supra note 51, at 683 (noting criticism of objective indicia because 
their legal importance is difficult to determine); Thomas, supra note 35, at 2106-07 (hoping 
that more decisions from the Federal Circuit based on objective indicia would provide 
guidance and help lower courts to apply objective indicia in patent cases). 
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both attempt to avoid this trap. As detailed above, however, both 
could also do more to avoid the problem of hindsight, while still 
addressing other legitimate policy concerns.  A hybrid model that 
adopts the US model of finding problems known in the field includes 
serious consideration by the evaluator of why references might not 
have been combined, and gives increased weight to objective indicia 
and secondary considerations would help reduce the influence of 
hindsight in the United States and in Europe and help bring both 
systems closer to their ideal of a hindsight free patent system. 
 

